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Banks are key players in the financial sector of any nation’s economy and sound macroeconomic management 
must ensure the financial health of banks in order to guarantee economic stability and economic growth. The 
study asks whether capital regulation merely addresses the immediate and short-term problem of illiquidity or it 
has a far-reaching effect of forestalling distress amongst banks in Nigeria. Data collected from the Central Bank 
of Nigeria and the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation for the period 1997-2006 was used to test the research 
hypotheses using correlation analysis. Results show that there exist a relationship between increase in minimum 
capital base of the commercial banks and their liquidity and asset quality as both liquidity levels and asset quality 
tend to improve with recapitalisation. Despite these findings, the period after 2006 recorded four insolvent banks 
as evidenced in Ndanusa (2009) and Alford (2010). The paper concludes that the post 2006 crisis were clear 
indications that increasing minimum capital requirement of banks alone only account for a short-term 
improvement in the liquidity position of banks and improvement in their asset quality but do not have the long-
term effect of forestalling distress. The study suggests that a lot more need to be done in curbing financial distress 
among commercial banks in Nigeria than mere increase of their minimum capital requirement. Such other 
approaches as improving the corporate governance of banks must be adopted to forestall future occurrence of the 




The financial sector is one of the dominant economic sectors in Nigeria. Banks are key players in any country‟s 
financial sector, „they occupy a delicate position in the economic equation of any country such that their (good or 
bad) performance invariably affects the economy of the country‟ (Wilson, 2006). Studies have shown that the 
banking sector which actually started in Nigeria in 1892 (See Nwankwo, 1980) has been largely volatile with 
spates of banking failure experienced in most parts of the 1990s, and in the early and mid 2000s. 
 
A strategy often utilised to strengthen banks in Nigeria and save them from financial distress is capital regulation 
by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). A cursory look at the history of banking in Nigeria reveals that the CBN 
has found reasons to shore up the capital base of Nigerian banks a number of times since 1980s. “From a modest 
value of N10 million naira minimum paid-up capital in 1988, Nigerian commercial banks were required to 
maintain capital not below N50 million in 1991. Between 1991 and 2005 subsequent increases have also been 
made ranging from N500 million in 1997; N1billion in 2001; N2 billion in 2002 to N25 billion in 2005” 
(Onaolapo, 2006). 
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This paper investigates the efficacy of capital regulation in saving Nigerian banks from financial distress. There 
are a few research outputs (Onaolapo, 2008: 114) to show whether or not, and the extent to which, capital 
regulation has saved Nigerian commercial banks from financial distress. This paper contributes to empirical 
research on the subject. 
 
The paper is presented in five sections. After this introduction, a review of literature on the relationship amongst 
liquidity, recapitalisation and banking distress is presented. Section three presents the research methodology. In 
section four, we present the results of the data analysis and discuss them. Section five concludes the paper and 




The terms bank failure and bank distress have been closely interchanged in the literature. Bank failure or distress 
could be loosely defined as the inability of a bank to meet up with its financial obligation to its customers. In 
technical terms, banks are defined as financially distressed when they are technically insolvent and/or illiquid 
(Brownbridge, 1998). In financial terms, to be insolvent means that a business is both unable to meet its current 
obligations and settle its outstanding debts (Bibeault, 1982; Glaessner and Mas, 1995). The authors also posit that 
insolvency (as described above) and financial distress/failure are two different things. This is mainly because 
distress or failure occurs when insolvency is officially recognised and the organisation is closed or measures are 
taken towards consolidation or merger. 
 
In Nigeria, the problem of bank distress has been observed as far back as 1930s. According to Soyibo and 
Adekanye (1992) between 1930 and 1958, over 21 bank failures were recorded in the Nigerian banking sector. 
The banking failures during that era may have been caused by the domination of foreign banks in terms of the 
exclusive patronage by British firms (Soyibo and Adekanye, 1992). Banks distress was also recorded in the 1990s 




 shows that the total number of banks in Nigeria was 115 in 1995. The number of distressed banks grew 
from 15 in 1991 to about 55 in 1994; 60 banks were known to be distressed in 1995 and by 1997, the number of 
problem banks had reduced to 47. As at year end 2002 that number reduced significantly to 13, then 15 in 2001 
before dropping again to 10 shortly before the 2004 banking consolidation. (CBN and NDIC Annual Reports, 
2002-2006).  
 
A number of reasons have been attributed to financial distress of commercial banks. According to Sanusi (2002) 
as cited in Musa (2010), one major cause of the distress in the sector was that the increase in the number of banks 
overstretched the existing human resources capacity of banks which resulted into many problems such as poor 
credit appraisal system, financial crimes, accumulation of poor asset quality among others. A result of the reason 
stated above is that most if not all of the banks that failed in Nigeria failed due to non-performing loans. Arrears 
affecting more than half the loan portfolio were typical of the failed banks. Many of the bad debts were 
attributable to moral hazard: the adverse incentives on bank owners to adopt imprudent lending strategies, in 
particular insider lending and lending at high interest rates to borrowers in the most risky segments of the credit 
markets contrary to the interests of the bank's creditors (mainly depositors or the government if it explicitly or 
implicitly insures deposits), which, if unsuccessful, would jeopardize the solvency of the bank (Brownbridge, 
1998). 
 
On close scrutiny, it will also be observed that the single biggest contributor to the bad loans of many of the failed 
banks in Nigeria was insider lending
2
. Insider loans accounted for 65 percent of the total loans of the four banks 
liquidated in Nigeria in 1995, virtually all of which was unrecoverable (NDIC, 1994). The threat posed by insider 
lending to the soundness of the banks was exacerbated because many of the insider loans were invested in 
speculative projects such as real estate development, breached large-loan exposure limits, and were extended to 
projects which could not generate short-term returns (such as hotels and shopping centres), with the result that the 
maturities of the bank's assets and liabilities were imprudently mismatched. The high incidence of insider lending 
among failed banks suggests that problems of moral hazard were especially acute in these banks. In our own 
speculations, several factors contributed to this. 
 
                                                             
1 See Appendix i 
2 See Appendix ii 
International Journal of Business and Social Science                               Vol. 3 No. 10 [Special Issue – May 2012] 
300 
 
First, politicians were involved as shareholders and directors of some of the banks. Political connections were 
used to obtain public-sector deposits: many of the failed banks obtained their deposits from the public sector 
(Ministries and Parastatals). And because of political pressure, the parastatals which made these deposits are 
unlikely to have made a purely commercial judgment as to the safety of their deposits. Moreover, the availability 
of parastatal deposits reduced the need to mobilize funds from the public. Hence, these banks faced little pressure 
from depositors to establish a reputation for safety. 
 
Political connections also facilitated access to bank licenses and were used in some cases to pressure bank 
regulators not to take action against banks when violations of the banking laws were discovered. All these factors 
reduced the constraints on imprudent bank management.  In addition, the banks' reliance on political connections 
meant that they were exposed to pressure to lend to the politicians themselves in return for the assistance given in 
obtaining deposits, licenses, etc. 
 
It was as a response to yet another round of impending crisis on the banking sector that on July 6, 2004, the 
Central Bank of Nigeria announced a major reform programme that would transform the banking landscape of the 
country. The main thrust of the 13-point reform agenda was the prescription of a minimum shareholders‟ funds of 
N25 billion for a Nigerian deposit money bank not later than December 31, 2005. The banks were expected to 
shore up their capital through the injection of fresh funds where applicable, but were most importantly encouraged 
to enter into merger/acquisition arrangements with other relatively smaller banks thus taking the advantage of 
economies of scale to reduce cost of doing business and enhance their competitiveness locally and internationally 
(Bello, 2008).  
 
This was not the first time that Nigerian Banks were asked to shore up their capital base. From a modest value of 
N10million naira minimum paid-up capital in 1988, Nigerian commercial banks were required to maintain capital 
not below N50 million in 1991. Between 1991 and 2005 subsequent increases have also been made ranging from 
N500 million in 1997; N1billion in 2001; N2billion in 2002 to N25 billion in 2005 (Onaolapo, 2006). 
 
Recapitalisation is used as a strategy to address the insolvency of banks and forestall future possibilities of 
financial distress. In the 1990s crisis of the banking sector in Nigeria, policy makers thought that most of the 
failed banks were undercapitalized, in part because the minimum capital requirements in force when they had 
been set up were very low (Brownbridge, 1998). Recapitalisation is therefore thought not only to be capable of 
resuscitating insolvent banks but also strengthen them especially through mergers. According to Somoye (2008) 
the economic rationale for domestic consolidation is indisputable; it makes banking more cost efficient because 
larger banks can eliminate excess capacity in areas like data processing, personnel, and marketing or overlapping 
branch networks. Cost efficiency also could increase if more efficient banks acquired less efficient ones. 
 
This paper investigates whether the 2005 recapitalisation resuscitated banks from their liquidity problems and 




This study investigates the impact of capital regulation on banks‟ liquidity position and financial distress in 
Nigeria. The following research questions were asked to guide analysis: 
 
i. Has the increase in the level of bank minimum paid-up capital improved liquidity ratio of Nigerian banks? 
ii. Has the increase in the level of bank minimum paid-up capital improved the asset quality of Nigerian banks. 
iii. Did the outcomes of „i‟ and „ii‟ above forestalled subsequent insolvencies and distress in the Nigerian banking 
sector? 
 
The research needed to collect data on banks‟ minimum paid-up capital at different times during the ten year 
period of the study (1997-2006), determine the asset quality of the banks from their financial records, and 
calculate their liquidity ratio as well determine the number of distressed banks within the Nigerian financial 
system during the period of study. The study collected these data from the Central Bank of Nigeria and Nigeria 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Annual Reports and Statements of Accounts for the period of study. 
 
Though there is more than one category of banks in Nigeria as at the time of the capital base regulation of 2005, 
the study collected and utilised data on 25 commercial banks in Nigeria.  
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A study of the commercial banks is considered sufficient because the commercial banking sector accounted for 
91.21 percent of total assets of the financial services industry in 2001 (Adam, 2008). Thus, the commercial 
banking sub-sector is sufficient in size and capacity to be used as sample of the entire banking industry in Nigeria.  
The data was analysed to provide answers to the research questions using correlation analysis. Questions „i‟ and 
„ii‟ were answered from the results of a Pearson Product Moment Correlation Analysis. 
 
The Karl Pearson Product Moment Correlation usually calculates the correlation coefficient (denoted „r‟) to 
describe the strength of the relationship between two sets of variables.  It can assume any value from -1 to +1, for 
example. A correlation of -1 or +1 indicates a perfect correlation, which is negative in the former and positive in 
the latter. If there is absolutely no relationship between the two sets of variables, Pearson „r‟ will be zero. A 
correlation of coefficient close to zero shows that the relationship is quite weak. The formula for calculating the 
Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient is given as follows: 
 











To answer research question „iii‟ we used secondary sources of data to determine the reoccurrence of insolvency 
and financial distress amongst commercial banks in the post-2006 period.   
 
Results and Discussions 
 
In this section, effort is made to respond to the three research questions raised in the preceding section.  Results of 




To examine the correlation between minimum capital and liquidity ratio of Nigerian banks, the variables used are 
the minimum capital requirement and liquidity ratio for the ten year period under study (1997-2006). The 
minimum capital requirement represents the X variable while liquidity ratio represents Y variable. However, the 
correlation coefficient is symmetric: Corr. (X, Y) = Corr. (Y, X). The computations are shown in Appendix iii. 
Substituting the values computed in Appendix iii into the following equation, we compute the PPMCC: 
 









2     
 
r = 0.1522. Though there exist a relationship between the variables, the relationship is a very weak one as the 
value of „r‟ is far less than 1 which indicates perfect correlation and close to zero which indicates perfect non-
correlation. This implies that an increase in capital alone is not enough to bring about a significant change in 




To examine the correlation between minimum capital requirement and asset quality of Nigerian banks, the 
variables used are the minimum capital requirement and asset quality for the ten year period under study (1997-
2006). The minimum capital requirement represents the X variable while asset quality represents Y variable. The 
correlation coefficient is symmetric: Corr. (X, Y) = Corr. (Y, X). The computations are shown in Appendix iv. 
Substituting the values computed in Appendix iv into the following equation, we compute the PPMCC: 
 












The value of „r‟ is found to be -0.553. This indicates a rather weak negative relationship as the value is close to 
negative zero. This means that bank recapitalization and asset quality are negatively related but its not perfect 
negative relationship since it‟s less than -1 which indicates perfect negative correlation. In essence, 
recapitalization does not alone bring about any improvement in asset quality. 
 
 






To examine the relationship between minimum capital requirement and bank distress, a simple regression model 
was utilised. The variables used are the minimum capital requirement and number of distressed banks with 
minimum capital requirement as the independent variable, „x‟ while number of distressed banks is the dependent 
variable „y‟. Thus, the equation of the line will be Y=bo +b1 X where bo and b1 are the regression coefficients. 
But:  
Ŷ= bo +b1x1=∑y/k = β.  






The computations are shown in Appendix v. Substituting the values into the above equations, we find the equation 
of the line to be, Y = 24.1 + 0.000543X. 
 
The coefficient of determination R
2 
is 0.000543 far below 1. Therefore it means that the independent variable X 
(minimum capital requirement) only accounts for 0.0543% of the variation or change in the dependent variable Y 
(number of distressed banks). Other factors therefore also contribute to the level of failure of the banks. 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
This study has examined the relationship between bank recapitalisation and financial distress of banks in Nigeria. 
The paper was mainly interested in establishing whether or not bank capital regulation has any impact in 
forestalling financial distress especially amongst commercial banks in Nigeria. From the results of the study, we 
conclude that even though there exist a relationship between increase in minimum capital requirement and the 
variables liquidity ratio of banks, bank asset quality and bank distress, the relationship is so weak and 
insignificant as to confirm that increasing minimum capital requirement can forestall bank financial distress 
(enrich this conclusion please) The results no doubt serve in providing a rich insight into the issue of over-
concentration of efforts by most of our Nigeria‟s reform programs at increasing minimum capital requirement 
while neglecting the other factors that would have, together with a sound capital base stem the problem of 
banking failure and ensure a sound financial system. This could have informed the recent effort of the Central 
Bank of Nigeria to strengthen commercial banks through the strengthening of corporate governance mechanisms 
rather than through capital base regulation alone. 
 
It is on the basis of the foregoing, that this study recommends that capital regulation should be a component of a 
total reform framework to ensure effectiveness. For example, the last reform included other parameters of bank 
financial health like stricter enforcement of quality corporate governance principles, zero tolerance on 
misreporting and infractions, strengthening risk management systems in the banks, risk-based supervision, closer 
collaboration with the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (E.F.C.C.) in the establishment of the 
Financial Intelligence Unit (F.I.U.) and enforcement of anti-money laundering measures, work towards the 
establishment of an Asset management Company as an important element of distress resolution, promoting the 
enforcement of dormant laws like the vicarious liabilities of the board members of the banks in cases of failings 
by the banks, e.t.c.. But attention was only given to increasing the minimum capital requirement to the detriment 
of other components of the reform. It is the view of this paper, arising from the review of the literature and data 
analysis, that equal attention and force where necessary should also be employed in enforcing the implementation 
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Appendix ii: Ratio of Insider Loans to Total Loans and Ratio of Non-Performing Loans to Total 




Closed Banks Date of 
Closure 
Ratio of Insider 
Loans to Total 
Loans (%) 
Ratio of Non-
Performing Loans to 
Total Loans (%) 
1 Financial Merchant Bank 1994 66.90 99.50 
2 Kapital Merchant Bank 1994 50.00 96.20 
3 Alpha Merchant bank 1994 55.00 90.00 
4 United Commercial Bank 1994 81.00 90.00 
5 Republic Bank 1995 64.90 98.00 
6 Commercial Trust Bank 1998 55.90 100.00 
7 Commerce Bank 1998 52.00 86.90 
8 Credite Bank 1998 76.00 98.30 
9 Prime Merchant Bank 1998 80.70 100.00 
10 Group Merchant Bank 1998 77.60 94.50 
11 Nigeria Merchant Bank 1998 99.90 95.90 
12 Royal Merchant Bank 1998 69.00 98.00 
 
Source: NDIC Annual Report (Various Issues) 
 
Appendix iii: Correlation Results of Minimum Capital Requirement and Liquidity Ratio of 
Nigerian Commercial Banks. 
 












1997 500 40.2 20,100 250,000 1616.04 
1998 500 46.8 23,400 250,000 2190.24 
1999 500 61.0 30,500 250,000 3721 
2000 500 64.1 32,050 250,000 4108.81 
2001 1000 52.9 52,900 1,000,000 2798.41 
2002 1000 52.5 52,500 1,000,000 2756.25 
2003 2000 50.9 101,800 4,000,000 2590.81 
2004 2000 50.5 101,000 4,000,000 2550.25 
2005 2000 50.2 100,400 4,000,000 2520.04 
2006 25000 55.7 1,392,500 625,000,000 3102.49 






 Appendix iv: Computation of PPMCC: Question 1 
 r= 10X1,907,150-35,000X524.8 
  ________________________________________________________________ 
  √10X640,000,000-1,225,000,000 X √10X27,954.34-275,415.8 
  
 = 19, 071, 500-18,368,000 
  _______________________ 
  71,937.47 X 64.25 
  
 = 703,500 
  _______ 
  4,622,148.99 
 
 = 0.1522  
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Appendix v: Correlation Results of Minimum Capital Requirement and Asset Quality of Nigerian 
Commercial Banks. 
 












1997 500 256.810 128405 250,000 65951.38 
1998 500 19.350 9675 250,000 374.42 
1999 500 20.725 10362.5 250,000 429.53 
2000 500 21.500 10750 250,000 462.25 
2001 1000 16.900 16900 1,000,000 285.61 
2002 1000 21.300 21300 1,000,000 453.69 
2003 2000 21.600 43200 4,000,000 466.56 
2004 2000 23.080 46160 4,000,000 532.69 
2005 2000 24.600 49200 4,000,000 605.16 
2006 25000 30.500 762500 625,000,000 930.25 






Appendix vi: Computation of PPMCC: Question ii 
r= 10X 1,098,452.5 – 35,000X456.365 
  _________________________________________________________________ 
  √10X640,000,000 – 1,225,000,000 X √10X70,491.54 – 208,269.01 
 
  = 10,984,525 – 15,972,775 
  _______________________ 
  71,937.47 X 704.731 
 
= -4,988,250 
  ____________ 
  50,696,598.19  
  
= -0.0984 
